




TOWARDS AN HOLISTIC ENVIRONMENTAL FLOW REGIME IN CHILE: 
PROVIDING FOR ECOSYSTEM HEALTH AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS  




A widespread response to the pressures being placed on the ecological condition of 
rivers is the design and implementation of environmental flow regimes in domestic 
regulatory frameworks for water. Environmental interests in water are not confined to 
hydrological functioning but include relationships between water resources and human 
cultural and economic livelihoods, including those of Indigenous communities. Since the 
mid-1980s there has been some provision for environmental flows in Chile, however the 
legal and policy requirements are limited in scope and coverage and have been poorly 
implemented by regulatory institutions. In this article, we critically examine the 
treatment of environmental flows in Chilean legal and policy frameworks. We argue that 
there is an urgent need for a comprehensive minimum flow regime in Chile to protect 
the environmental qualities of rivers, which must also reflect and provide for Indigenous 
water rights and interests. The developing constitutional crisis in Chile, the most 
significant political crisis since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990), 
highlights the need to revisit the sensitive and unresolved issues of water governance 
and equity. 
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In Chile, as in many parts of the world, water resources are under growing pressure. 
Chile has highly variable water conditions, from very arid areas of the north to the well-
watered south.1 As a long, thin country bordered by the Cordillera de Los Andes on one 
side and the Pacific Ocean on the other, Chile is a country of rivers. More than 1251 
rivers located in 101 basins 2  run the length of Chile, supplying water for (often 
competing) social, cultural, economic and environmental uses. In some areas, such as 
the North of Chile, water is scarce and may be over-allocated. In other areas at the centre 
of the country, rivers are modified from their natural state and may be contaminated by 
pollution. 3  Overall water quality has improved in recent years in Chile because of 
advancements in wastewater treatment,4 although Chilean water resources continue to 
experience elevated salinity, metal concentrations and high levels of nitrates.5 In many 
parts of Chile, especially central and northern regions, there is strong economic demand 
for water for agriculture, urban and industry (mining and energy) purposes,6 which place 
 
*All translations have been carried out by the authors. 
1 OECD, Water Resources Allocation Chile (2015) available at: https://www.oecd.org/chile/Water-
Resources-Allocation-Chile.pdf. 
2 Dirección General de Aguas, ‘Atlas del Agua’ [Atlas of Water] (Dirección General de Aguas, 
Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Chile, 2016), at p 18. 
3 R. Valdés-Pineda, R. Pizarro, P. García-Chevesich, J. B. Valdés, C. Olivares, M. Vera, F. Balocchi, F. 
Pérez, C. Vallejos, R. Fuentes, A. Abarza, and B. Helwig, ‘Water governance in Chile: Availability, 
management and climate change’, Journal of Hydrology, 519 (2014), 2538–67, 2539, 2544; P. Pino, V. 
Iglesias, R. Garreaud, S. Cortés, M. Canals, W. Folch, S. Burgos, K. Levy, L. P. Naeher, and K. 
Steenland, ‘Chile Confronts its Environmental Health Future After 25 Years of Accelerated Growth’, 
Annals of Global Health, 81/3 (2015), 354–67; Á. Alonso, R. Figueroa, and P. Castro-Díez, ‘Pollution 
Assessment of the Biobío River (Chile): Prioritization of Substances of Concern Under an 
Ecotoxicological Approach’, Environmental management, 59/5 (2017), 856–69. 
4 G. Donoso (ed.), ‘Introduction’ in Water Policy in Chile, (Springer, 2018) 2. 
5 See A. S. Vega, K. Lizama, and P. A. Pastén, ‘Water Quality: Trends and Challenges’ in G. Donoso 
(ed.), Water Policy in Chile, (Springer, 2018). 
6 See C. J. Bauer, ‘Dams and Markets: Rivers and Electrical Power in Chile’, Natural Resources 
Journal, 49 (2009), 583–651; J. Budds, ‘Power, Nature and Neoliberalism: The Political Ecology of 
Water in Chile’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 25/3 (2004), 322–42; S. Babidge and P. 
Bolados, ‘Neoextractivism and Indigenous Water Ritual in Salar de Atacama, Chile’, Latin American 




strain on the social and environmental uses of rivers. However, in many instances in the 
South, water availability exceeds demand,7 and there remain rivers that remain free from 
major human intervention and damage.8  
Chile also has an important Indigenous heritage, with a number of distinct 
Indigenous peoples holding traditional connections and rights to land and water 
resources throughout the country,9 regardless of whether or how these interests are 
recognised by governments. Indigenous conceptions of water resources, including in 
Chile, are routinely described as being different from dominant or Western approaches 
which often frame resources in terms of property or use rights. In the south of Chile, for 
example, Mapuche communities conceive of water resources as being connected to their 
ancestors, metaphysical entities and the total embodiment of nature, and have a sacred 
connection to and respect for water.10 For other Indigenous groups in the north, such as 
the Aymara and Atacameño communities, where water resources are a vital element of 
the agricultural economy, water plays an important role in Indigenous political 
organization and identity.11 
 
and the indigenous community in Chiu Chiu, El Loa Province, northern Chile’, Singapore Journal of 
Tropical Geography, 33/1 (2012), 93–107. 
7 See Valdés-Pineda, Pizarro, García-Chevesich, Valdés, Olivares, Vera, Balocchi, Pérez, Vallejos, 
Fuentes, Abarza, and Helwig, ‘Water governance in Chile: Availability, management and climate 
change’, 2563. 
8 For example, according to the Chilean National Committee on large dams, there are no large dams in 
the Austral Region of Chile’s south. See http://www.icoldchile.cl/directorio/. 
9 Aylwin J., Pueblos Indigenas de Chile: Antecedentes Historicos y Situacion Actual [Indigenous 
Comunities of Chile: History and Current Situation] (Instituto de Estudios Indigenas Universidad de la 
Frontera, 1994) vol 1; Nancy Yañez and Raul Molina, Las Aguas Indigenas En Chile [Indigenous 
Waters in Chile] (LOM Ediciones, 2011). 
10 See generally Barrera-Hernández L., ‘Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource 
Development: Chile’s Mapuche Peoples and the Right to Water’ (2005) 11(1) Annual Survey of 
International & Comparative Law. 
11See M. Prieto and M. Prieto, ‘Bringing water markets down to Chile’s Atacama Desert’, Water 
International, 41/2 (2016), 191–212, 192.; Manuel Prieto, ‘Privatizing Water and Articulating 
Indigeneity: The Chilean Water Reforms and the Atacameño People (Likan Antai)’, The University of 
Arizona 2014; Castro M., Bahamondes M., Albornoz P., Basaure M. F., Cayo S. B, Larama S., Hidalgo 




Consistent with the international context, 12  there is a growing concern that 
pollution and low or absent flow rates in Chile’s rivers are a consequence of 
anthropogenic water extractions and overuse of freshwater resources.13 There is parallel 
concern about the ongoing exclusion of Indigenous peoples from water access and 
governance, and the failure of Chilean law to reflect cultural rights, aspirations and 
needs.14 Chile’s water crisis is playing out in the context of growing social and political 
movements about structural inequality,15 and is exacerbated by the effects of climate 
change,16 and the inability of regulatory frameworks and institutions to adapt fast enough 
to manage water as a scarce and threatened resource.17  
In this article, we examine the limited provision and implementation of 
environmental flows in Chilean law and policy, and consider the treatment of Indigenous 
water rights and interests in their planning. To do so we have carried out in-depth 
 
[Customary Rights in Irrigation Management in Chiapa. The Waters of ‘Tata Jachura’] (Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, 2017);S. Babidge, ‘Contested value and an ethics of resources: Water, mining and 
indigenous people in the Atacama Desert, Chile’, The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 27/1 (2016), 
84–103, 92. 
12 See A. H. Arthington, Environmental flows: saving rivers in the third millennium, 1 ed. (University of 
California Press, 2012), vol. iv, 14 for an overview of environmental flows in international theory and 
practice. 
13 See C. J. Bauer, ‘Water conflicts and entrenched governance problems in Chile’s market model’, 
Water Alternatives, 8/2 (2015), 159 for a contemporary overview of Chile’s water management 
challenges. But see Introduction in Donoso, ed, Water Policy in Chile, 2. Donoso argues that Chile’s 
water challenges are also a result of naturally high levels of heavy metals in Chilean water resources.  
14 E. Macpherson, Indigenous Rights to Water in Law and Regulation: Lessons from Comparative 
Experiences, (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 161–210; A. Á. Marín, ‘Constitutional Challenges of 
the South: Indigenous Water Rights in Chile - Another Step in the “Civilizing Mission?’, Windsor 
Yearbook of Access to Justice, 33/3 (2017), 87; M. D. Davis, ‘Indigenous Rights and Modern Water 
Management in Chile’, Critical Transitions in Water and Environmental Resources Management, pp. 1–
12, 3–4. 
15 See J. Bartlett, ‘Chile Protests: UN to Investigate Claims of Human Rights Abuses after 18 Deaths’, 
24 October 2019, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/24/chile-protests-human-
rights-un-investigation. See generally C. J. Bauer, ‘Water conflicts and entrenched governance problems 
in Chile’s market model’, Water Alternatives, 8/2 (2015) which discusses the intensification of water 
conflicts in Chile in the past decade and their rising profile in public debate. 
16 Valdés-Pineda, Pizarro, García-Chevesich, Valdés, Olivares, Vera, Balocchi, Pérez, Vallejos, Fuentes, 
Abarza, and Helwig, ‘Water governance in Chile: Availability, management and climate change’, 2563. 
17 See Marín, ‘Constitutional Challenges of the South: Indigenous Water Rights in Chile - Another Step 




analysis of Chilean legislation, case law, and legislative reform proposals and debates in 
the political, historical and cultural context, some of which is yet to be exhibited for an 
English-speaking audience.18 In doing so we also draw on our combined experience as 
legal researchers and practitioners working in environmental law and Indigenous rights 
in Chile and Australasia, for Indigenous peoples, governments and private interests.   
We are concerned with the development and implementation of law and policy 
in context, and so we pay attention both to the written content of laws, judicial decisions 
and law reform proposals and debates, identified through doctrinal legal research 
methods, and their contextualisation in the interdisciplinary scholarship.19 We note that 
public and academic debates around water, human rights and indigenous rights are 
highly polarised in Chile, 20  and we have attempted to do justice to a spectrum of 
scholarly and public opinion, although we remain grounded by the actual laws, policies 
and jurisprudence in force. During the writing of this article, Chile erupted into a state 
of social protest not seen since the time of dictatorship. This has required and enabled 
us to consider the provision for environmental flows in the context of the unfolding 
social and constitutional crisis. As the legal and policy landscape is developing rapidly 
in Chile, in some situations, there is no academic commentary or analysis for legal or 
policy proposals other than media coverage and, in these situations, our interpretations 
are naturally tempered. 
Given Australia’s existing experience with environmental flows, and more recent 
agitation and concern around Indigenous water rights, including the ‘cultural flows’ 
 
18 For other recent examples of English language commentary see Bauer, ‘Water conflicts and 
entrenched governance problems in Chile’s market model’; Donoso, ed, Water Policy in Chile.  
19 See M. V. Hoeke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’, in M. V. Hoeke (ed.), Epistemology and 
Methodology of Comparative Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 165. 




policy, 21  we make occasional reference to the Australian experience. However, we 
emphasise that the Australian experience must be treated carefully, in its own particular 
historical, political and social context, as a model with its own challenges and flaws.22 
We are not advocating for the adoption or ‘transplantation’23 of the Australian approach 
in Chile, but maintain that reflecting on foreign experiences can help elucidate domestic 
concerns.24  
We argue that there is need for a comprehensive minimum flow regime in Chile 
to protect environmental or ecological water qualities and take into account Indigenous 
rights and interests. At a minimum, this regime must exempt users, including Indigenous 
peoples and environmentalists, who leave river flows in-stream, from paying fines for 
‘non-use’. This is not at the expense of substantive water rights for Indigenous peoples 
that may be used for consumptive, productive or economic purposes, but should be 
implemented alongside existing mechanisms that fund the recognition and allocation of 
water rights for Indigenous peoples.25  
We acknowledge that setting aside an adequate water allocation for 
environmental or cultural purposes in Chile will not be easy, and that transformative 
 
21 See A. C. Horne, Erin O’Donnell, and Rebecca E Tharme, ‘Mechanisms to Allocate Environmental 
Water’, in Angus Webb, A. C. Horne (eds.), Water for the environment : from policy and science to 
implementation and management, (2017); Murray Lower Darling Rivers Indigenous Nations and 
Northern Murray–Darling Basin Aboriginal Nations, ‘Agreed definition of cultural flows’. 
22 For a discussion of the ongoing inadequacies of Australian water law see, eg, S. Jackson, ‘Enduring 
and persistent injustices in water access in Australia’, Natural Resources and Environmental Justice: 
Australian Perspectives, (Victoria: CSIRO Publishing, 2017). 
23 For a discussion of legal transplants and their risks see J. Gillespie and P. Nicholson, Law and 
development and the global discourses of legal transfers., (Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge 
University Press, 2012., 2012). 
24 L. De Stefano, ‘International Initiatives for Water Policy Assessment: A Review’, Water Resources 
Management, 24/11 (2010), 2449–66, 2450. 
25 See the discussion of the need for allocation of consumptive water rights for Indigenous peoples, 





water reform has, until now, been impossible to secure.26 In the context of finite water 
resources, safeguarding environmental flows, and setting aside a flow of water for 
Indigenous use, may be costly and politically unpalatable, potentially requiring the 
redirection of water away from consumptive, economic purposes. Yet, if the Chilean 
Government is to ensure safe and reliable water resources for future generations, robust 
legal and policy frameworks that safeguard both environmental and cultural water uses 
will be crucial. The current constitutional crisis in Chile, the most significant political 
crisis since the end of the dictatorship, highlights the need to strive towards more 
inclusive and equitable water governance and allocation.27 
 
2. AN HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS 
The challenge of effective water regulation to ensure water availability and quality for 
present and future generations is not peculiar to Chile, but is a shared concern for the 
world community.28 Despite global concern about the availability of clean and sufficient 
water into the future, there is no international treaty that addresses access to and 
conservation of freshwater.29 There is growing international attention, however, to the 
right to water and water for the environment, which makes a clear link between resource 
 
26 See Bauer, ‘Water conflicts and entrenched governance problems in Chile’s market model’. Bauer 
explains the historical inability to fundamentally transform Chile’s ideologicized water law and policy 
model. 
27 As indications of local trends see Bonnefoy P. Chile’s President Says He Will Support a New 
Constitution, The New York Times (11 November 2019) available at:  
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/world/americas/chile-protests-new-constitution.html. See also the 
recent constitutional proposal: Presentan Reforma Constitutional que Consagra el Derecho al Agua 
[Presentation of a Constitutional Admendment to grant Human Rights to Water] Diario Constituticional 
(25 October 2019) available at: https://www.diarioconstitucional.cl/noticias/actualidad-
legislativa/2019/10/25/presentan-reforma-constitucional-que-consagra-el-derecho-humano-al-agua/. 
28See generally Sultana F. & Loftus A. (eds), The Right to Water: Politics, Governance and Social 
Struggles (Taylor and Francis, 2013); Langford M & Russell Anna FS, The Human Right to Water: 
Theory, Practice and Prospects (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
29 Tim Stephens, ‘Reimagining International Environmental Law’ in L. J. Kotzé, Environmental law and 




health and human culture and wellbeing, consistent with trends towards more holistic 
water management like the ‘hydrosocial cycle’ 30  and broadening of scientific 
approaches, which conceive of natural resources as ‘socio-ecological systems’.31  
The need to protect water for human and ecosystem health is increasingly 
acknowledged in a number of international and comparative legal documents. The 
Human Right to water, first recognised by the United Nations in 2010,32 is primarily 
concerned with ensuring access to water for drinking and sanitation. 33  There is a 
‘remarkable gap’ between the growing global consensus to recognise access to water for 
basic domestic purposes and legal frameworks that actually govern water access.34 
However, there is need to broaden the conceptualization of the human right to water 
support the protection and safeguarding of water for a range of social, cultural and 
environmental purposes. Failure to protect rivers from pollution or over-extraction, for 
example, directly impacts the realisation of the human right to water, so it can be argued 
that the normative content of the right to water therefore entails obligations for states in 
terms of ensuring both water quality and quantity.35 In this regard, the human right to 
water intersects with other developing areas of human rights and the environment in 
international and comparative law, including the right to a clean and healthy 
 
30 See J. Linton, ‘Modern water and its discontents: a history of hydrosocial renewal’, Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water, 1/1 (2014), 111–20. 
31 See generally L. M. Berrouet, J. Machado, and C. Villegas-Palacio, ‘Vulnerability of socio—
ecological systems: A conceptual Framework’, Ecological Indicators, 84 (2018), 632–47. 
32 UN GA Agenda Item 48 A/64/L.63/Rev.1 of 26 July 2010, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation. 
Available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/64/L.63/Rev.1.  
33 J. Gilbert, Natural resources and human rights: an appraisal, First ed. (Oxford University Press, 
2018), 58. 
34 M. Langford and A. F. S. Russell, The human right to water : theory, practice and prospects, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017), 58. 
35 I. Winkler, Human Right to Water: Significance, Legal Status and Implications for Water Allocation, 




environment, 36  and the rights of Indigenous peoples over natural resources and 
territories.37 International debates around human rights, the environment and water are 
also playing out in the emerging ‘transnational’ 38  trend of ‘environmental 
constitutionalism’ or ‘the constitutional incorporation of substantive and procedural 
environmental rights, responsibilities and remedies to protect the natural environment’, 
especially in Latin America where some of the ‘most innovative and energetic’ 
approaches to environmental constitutionalism are developing.39 
International concern surrounding water and its numerous values and uses is 
captured in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable 
Development Goals, in particular SDG 6, which places pressure on states to, ‘[e]nsure 
availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all’.40 The OECD 
has also been working on domestic prerequisites for sustainable water management, 
arguing that:41 
Well-designed allocation regimes contribute to multiple policy objectives: economic 
efficiency, by allocating resources to higher value uses as well as contributing to 
innovation and investment in water use efficiency; environmental performance by 
 
36 See generally J. H. Knox and R. Pejan, The human right to a healthy environment, (2018). 
37 See generally S. J. Anaya, ‘Divergent Discourses about International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and 
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist Trend Papers’, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy, 16 (2005), 237–58. 
38 See generally Jolene Lin, ‘The emergence of Transnational Environmental Law in the Anthropocene’ 
in Kotzé, Environmental law and governance for the anthropocene chapter 15, for a discussion of the 
transnational nature of environmental law in the anthropocene. 
39 E. Daly and James May (eds.), Implementing Environmental Constitutionalism: Current Global 
Challenges, (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1, 7. 
40 United Nations, Sustainable Development Goal 6: Synthesis Report on Water and Sanitation (2018) at 
10, available at: 
https://www.unwater.org/app/uploads/2018/12/SDG6_SynthesisReport2018_WaterandSanitation_04122
018.pdf. 





securing adequate flows to support ecosystems services; and equity by sharing the 
risks of shortage among water users fairly. 
 
A widespread response to the pressures placed on the environmental qualities of 
rivers is to implement ‘environmental flow’ regimes in domestic regulatory frameworks 
for water.42 Such regimes introduce the environment as a legitimate ‘user’ of water,43 
including for ‘ecosystem services’,44 defined by Arthington as ‘the tangible benefits 
people gain from ecosystems’. 45  ‘Environmental water’ is a broad term, used to 
encompass both legal rights for the environment as a consumptive user and mechanisms 
that impose conditions on other users (e.g. an extraction cap), however, the term 
‘environmental flow’ typically contemplates minimum in-stream flows or reserves 
which do not form part of the consumptive pool of water allocated to extractive use.46 
The Brisbane Declaration and Global Action Agenda on Environmental Flows of 2018 
provides the following revised definition of environmental flows:47 
Environmental flows describe the quantity, timing, and quality of freshwater flows 
and levels necessary to sustain aquatic ecosystems which, in turn, support human 
cultures, economies, sustainable livelihoods, and well-being. 
 
42 See generally Arthington, Environmental flows: saving rivers in the third millennium. 
43 Webb J. A. et al, ‘Adaptive Management of Environmental Flows’ (2018) 61(3) Environmental 
Management, at p 339.  
44 L. Nahuelhual, G. Saavedra, F. Henríquez, F. Benra, X. Vergara, C. Perugache, and F. Hasen, 
‘Opportunities and limits to ecosystem services governance in developing countries and indigenous 
territories: The case of water supply in Southern Chile’, Environmental Science and Policy, 86 (2018), 
11–18, 11 
45 Arthington, Environmental flows: saving rivers in the third millennium, 15. 
46 Horne A., O’Donnell E. & Tharme R.E, ‘Mechanisms to Allocate Environmental Water’ in Angus 
Webb and Avril C Horne (eds), Water for the environment : from policy and science to implementation 
and management (2017), at p 361. 
47 ‘The Brisbane Declaration and Global Action Agenda on Environmental Flows (2018)’ 22nd 




The structure and method of providing for environmental flows differs from 
place to place, with a range of possible technical approaches for calculating and 
regulating the appropriate flow, however, Arthington summarises the typical approach 
to setting environmental flows as follows:48 
The majority of “in-stream flow” methods (70%; Tharme 2003) either provide 
simple rules founded on the hydrologic characteristics of surface water flows, or 
they quantify the flow volumes needed to maintain aquatic habitat in terms of water 
depth, velocity, and cover for selected species, usually fish of commercial or 
recreational value (e.g., salmonids). Often the flow recommended to support habitat 
is a “minimum flow,” the smallest amount of water that could maintain a wetted 
channel and provide opportunities for limited movement and maintenance feeding. 
Despite the Brisbane Declaration’s recognition that environmental flows support 
human cultures, economies and wellbeing as a component of ecosystem health, 
conceptual models underpinning environmental flows, until very recently, have tended 
to be restricted to biophysical interactions ‘eschewing socio-cultural complexity, local 
knowledge, and governance arrangements’.49 Advocates for an expanded conception of 
environmental flows argue for recognition of local and Indigenous governance 
frameworks and interests to build legitimacy in environmental flow regimes and water 
planning more broadly.50  
Human relationships with water hold particular importance for Indigenous 
communities who claim distinct relationships with water resources and the broader 
 
48 Arthington, Environmental flows: saving rivers in the third millennium, 19. 
49 Michael M Douglas et al, ‘Conceptualizing Hydro-Socio-Ecological Relationships to Enable More 
Integrated and Inclusive Water Allocation Planning’ (2019) 1(3) One Earth at pp 361, 361. See also 
Jackson S. ‘How Much Water Does Culture Need?’ in Horne A C & Webb A (eds), Water for the 
environment: from policy and science to implementation and management (2017), at p 185.  
50 O’Donnell E. & Macpherson E. ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Environmental Water Management 
in Chile: An Australian Perspective’ (2012) 23 (1) Journal of Water Law, at p  24. See also M. M. 
Douglas, S. Jackson, C. A. Canham, S. Laborde, L. Beesley, M. J. Kennard, B. J. Pusey, R. Loomes, and 
S. A. Setterfield, ‘Conceptualizing Hydro-socio-ecological Relationships to Enable More Integrated and 
Inclusive Water Allocation Planning’, One Earth, 1/3 (2019), 361–73, 362; Arthington, Environmental 




natural world, 51  and who are the repositories of valuable traditional knowledge on 
environmental protection.52 Tobin explains that Indigenous rights to natural resources 
are ‘vital for protection of their cultural integrity and their survival as distinct peoples’.53 
Typical to accounts of Indigenous relationships with natural resources, including in the 
Latin American context, is a closeness or familial interconnectedness between 
Indigenous cultures and nature, and an obligation to care for natural resources and 
protect their survival for future generations, as opposed to typical Western utilitarian 
accounts of nature as a commodity to be used.54 
In Latin America, the rights Indigenous peoples have to natural resources, 
including water, have been the subject of many significant decisions of both the Inter-
American Commission and Court of Human Rights who emphasise the right of 
Indigenous peoples to communal property over their resources in confronting resource 
development and extraction. 55  These decisions often refer to the protection of 
Indigenous territorial rights to natural resources under the International Labour 
Organisation’s Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples,56 which 
a number of Latin American countries (including Chile) have ratified. Convention 169 
 
51 See, eg, Hendrix B. A., ‘Context, Equality, and Aboriginal Compensation Claims’ (2011) 50 
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, at p 672. 
52 Lynda Collins, ‘Judging the Anthropocene’ in Kotzé, Environmental law and governance for the 
anthropocene, 323. 
53 Tobin B., Indigenous Peoples, Customary Law and Human Rights: Why Living Law Matters  
(Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), at p 141. 
54 See, eg, Bavikatte K. & Bennett T., ‘Community Stewardship: The Foundation of Biocultural Rights’ 
(2015) (1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, at p 7. 
55 Knox and Pejan, The human right to a healthy environment, 8. See, eg, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v Nicaragua (judgment) [2001] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Ser C) Case No. 79 
(‘Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (Judgment) (Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, (Ser C) Case No. 79, 31 August 2001)’); Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) [2007] Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 
172. 
56 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No. 169) [1989] 28 




requires States to: ‘respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of 
the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories’;57 recognise the 
rights of ‘rights of ownership and possession’ Indigenous peoples have over their 
traditional territories’;58 and safeguard the rights of Indigenous peoples to ‘participate in 
the use, management and conservation of these resources’.59 
In the Australian context, the concept of environmental flows has at times been 
interpreted by governments as encompassing a flow of water for Indigenous ‘cultural’ 
purposes, although ‘cultural flows’ have also been advocated for alongside but separate 
from environmental flow policies. 60  For example, the Australian National Cultural 
Flows Project has attempted to ‘secure a future where First Nations' water allocations 
are embedded within Australia's water planning and management regimes, to deliver 
cultural, spiritual and social benefits as well as environmental and economic benefits, to 
Aboriginal communities’.61 That project adopts the definition of cultural flows from the 
Echuca Declaration, as:62 
water entitlements that are legally and beneficially owned by Indigenous Nations of a 
sufficient and adequate quantity and quality, to improve the spiritual, cultural, 
environmental, social and economic conditions of those Indigenous Nations. This is our 
inherent right. 
 
57 Ibid art 13. 
58 Ibid, art 14. 
59 Ibid, art 15. 
60 See generally S. Jackson and Marcia Langton, ‘Trends in the Recognition of Indigenous Water Needs 
in Australian Water Reform: the Limitations of “Cultural” Entitlements in Achieving Water Equity’, 
Journal of Water Law, 22/2/3 (2012), 110. 
61 National Cultural Flows Research Project (2019) available at: http://culturalflows.com.au. 
62 Murray Lower Darling Rivers Indigenous Nations and Northern Murray–Darling Basin Aboriginal 





The idea of ‘cultural flows’ has emerged from Australia as an attempt by 
Indigenous communities to leverage off government support of environmental flows for 
specific Indigenous interests,63 and ensure that an adequate flow of the river is set aside 
for Indigenous values or uses in water planning. However, there has also been criticism 
of the cultural flows policy in Australia, on the basis that the terminology of cultural 
flows has been seized by Australian governments as a way to subsume Indigenous water 
interests within existing environmental flow regimes without needing to confront the 
difficult question of redistribution.64 Until recently, cultural flows have enjoyed little 
response from governments, in Australia or elsewhere, in terms of demarcating flows 
within a river or other waterway for Indigenous use. Those critical of cultural flows 
prefer to focus on the need for substantive water rights or allocations for Indigenous 
peoples to use water for any purpose they may wish to, including commercial use.65  
A recent article by Douglas et al helpfully emphasises the diverse uses 
Indigenous peoples make of rivers and encourages water planning to account for a range 
of Indigenous water uses and values, including through environmental flow processes. 
The authors develop a ‘hydro-socio-ecological conceptual model’ for the impacts of 
water abstraction in the Australian context, which involves a complex interplay of social, 
cultural and environmental dimensions.66  The authors identify a ‘need to recognize 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous governance and management systems at multiple scales 
 
63 Jackson, n. Error! Bookmark not defined. above, at p 181. 
64 Jackson S. & Langton M., ‘Trends in the Recognition of Indigenous Water Needs in Australian Water 
Reform: The Limitations of ‘Cultural’ Entitlements in Achieving Water Equity’ (2012) 22(2/3) Journal 
of Water Law, at p 110. See also Ibid at p 183. 
65 See, eg, E. Macpherson, ‘Beyond Recognition: Lessons from Chile for Allocating Indigenous Water 
Rights in Australia’, University of New South Wales Law Journal, 40/3 (2017), 1130–69. 
66 Douglas, Jackson, Canham, Laborde, Beesley, Kennard, Pusey, Loomes, and Setterfield, 
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to build legitimacy in e-flows and water planning’ and ‘propose guiding principles for 
using e-flows to protect aquatic ecosystems and their dependent human cultures and 
livelihoods’.67 
For the reasons emphasised by Douglas et al, we consider that it is important that 
any environmental flow regime contemplate setting aside a flow of a river for Indigenous 
interests, and meaningfully collaborate with Indigenous communities and institutions in 
environmental water management.  This is especially important in the context of market-
based allocation frameworks and strongly protected private use rights, where (without a 
specific flow allocation) Indigenous water use and management may be overridden by 
other users.68 The idea of involving Indigenous peoples’ governance and accounting for 
their rights in environmental flows is not at the expense of, and should be considered 
complementary to, the need for consumptive rights for Indigenous peoples to take water 
for any (including commercial) purposes.  As Jackson puts it:69 
In the pursuit of opportunities to secure water for indigenous use, instruments that 
deliver water to the environment could serve as model institutions through which to 
redress the historical neglect of indigenous water rights and interests and the 
transparently inequitable distribution of water. 
 
3. CHILE: A COUNTRY OF RIVERS 
Chile is a long and narrow country,70 and water resources and demand are unequally 
distributed throughout its 101 water basins. Chile’s hydrography presents particular 
 
67 Ibid 362. 
68 Macpherson E., Indigenous Rights to Water in Law and Regulation: Lessons from Comparative 
Experiences (Cambridge University Press, 2019) at pp 221–40. 
69 Jackson, n. Error! Bookmark not defined. above, at p 181. 





challenges for water regulation, with varying climate and geography across the territory 
influencing different freshwater ecosystems in different ways. Chile’s economy depends 
on a reliable supply of water for water intensive activities like agriculture, agroforestry, 
fisheries and mining, which (when combined) total almost 70 per cent of the country’s 
exports. 71  These activities present ever-increasing threats to the quality and the 
availability of water resources for environmental and social uses.72   
In July 2016, the OECD released an Environmental Performance Review for 
Chile.73 The report recognises both the significance of many Chilean regions in terms of 
global biodiversity, and the intense pressure on natural resources in the context of Chile’s 
extractive economy. Specifically, the OECD noted that freshwater ecosystems suffer 
from poor water quality and a large number of freshwater species are endangered.74 To 
compound this, the actual state of many of Chile’s rivers is unknown, due to ‘partial and 
unsystematic’ information collected and maintained on the condition of aquatic 
ecosystems.75  
Alongside the environmental degradation of Chile’s water resources, Chile has 
experienced a growth in water-related social conflict in recent years, between different 
 
71 World Bank, Report N PAD1275 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Project 
Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of USD 40.89 million to the Republic of Chile 
for the Integrated Water Resources Management and Infrastructure Development Project (2015), at pp 
10-11. 
72 Babidge and Bolados, ‘Neoextractivism and Indigenous Water Ritual in Salar de Atacama, Chile’; 
Bauer, ‘Dams and Markets: Rivers and Electrical Power in Chile’. 
73 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Environmental Performance Reviews: Chile 2016 (2016) (‘Environmental 
Performance Reviews’). This report is the second Environmental Performance Review of Chile. It 
evaluates progress towards sustainable development and green growth, with a focus on climate change 
and biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. 
74 Ibid, at pp 61-2. 
75 Riestra F., ‘Environmental Flow Policy’ in Donoso G (Ed.) Water Policy in Chile, Global Issues in 




user groups with differing water values and competing demands.76 Bauer has helpfully 
characterised these conflicts into four basic types (paraphrased below):77 
• River basin conflicts, particularly in central and southern Chile, involving 
multiple users of surface water, with hydropower often being the driving factor. 
• Conflicts about overexploited groundwater systems, particularly in the north, 
driven by large-scale mining, agriculture, and urban growth. 
• Conflicts about social and environmental issues broader than water use, but in 
which water issues are central. These conflicts typically involve large mining 
projects in northern and central Chile, or large hydroelectric projects in the south. 
• Conflicts that are not directly about conflicting water uses but more directly 
political, driven by clashing views about the water law itself and its fundamental 
rules, principles, and ideology. 
A review by the Chilean Human Rights Institute in 2018 established that out of 
116 socio-environmental conflicts within the country, 38 per cent relate to the energy 
productive sector and 28 per cent to mining activities. 78  Specifically in relation to 
conflicts over water, a 2010 report by environmental NGO Chile Sustentable reported 
26 conflicts across the country.79  According to this data, in the north one out of thirteen 
conflicts is linked to mining projects, in the central region four out of six conflicts 
 
76 Marín, ‘Constitutional Challenges of the South: Indigenous Water Rights in Chile - Another Step in 
the “Civilizing Mission?’, 97. García A., ‘Conflictos por el Agua: el Gran Capital contra las 
Comunidades Locales. Análisis Comparativo de las Cuencas de los Ríos Huasco (Desierto de Atacama) 
y Baker (Patagonia Austral) [Conflicts over water in Chile: big capital versus local communities. A 
comparative analysis of the Huasco (Atacama Dessert) and Baker (Austral Patagonia) River Basins] 
(2009) 18(4), En foco: Medio Ambiente, Sociedad y Desarrollo Sustentable, at p 695. 
77 Bauer, ‘Water conflicts and entrenched governance problems in Chile’s market model’, 154. 
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concern energy and hydropower developments, and in the southern region six out of 
seven are due to the construction of hydroelectric power stations.  
There are a number of emblematic cases of Chile’s water conflicts, which have 
taken place throughout the length of Chile. One of these is the Loa river basin in the 
north of Chile where water extractions for mining have had the effect of displacing local 
Indigenous agriculture.80 At the beginning of the twentieth century, extraction of copper, 
lithium and other minerals began in the north of Chile, producing various adverse 
impacts on freshwater resources and local Indigenous communities.81 After decades of 
mining expansion, the condition of rivers in the north of Chile is considered critical, as 
groundwater resources have reached exhaustion, and some glaciers, high altitude 
grasslands and wetlands have been irreversibly affected.82  
Another well-known case is that of Petorca in the central region where 
agricultural expansion has compounded the effects of drought leading to the area being 
declared as a ‘scarcity zone’, 83  and water is now regularly trucked in for drinking 
water. 84  Due to increasing water scarcity in northern and central Chile, private 
 
80 See Calderón M., Benaviedes C. Carmona J. Halvez D., Maleran N., Rodriguez M. & Sinclaire D., 
‘Gran Minería y Localidades Agrícolas en el Norte de Chile: Comparación Exploratoria de Tres Casos’ 
[Large Mining and Agricultural Localities in Northern Chile: Exploratory Comparison of Three Cases] 
(2016) 48(2) Chungará, Revista de Antropología Chilena, at pp 298-299. 
81 Including the Aymara, Atacameñas, Collas, Diaguitas y Quechua. See Babidge, ‘Contested value and 
an ethics of resources: Water, mining and indigenous people in the Atacama Desert, Chile’. 
82 See generally Babidge and P. Bolados, ‘Neoextractivism and Indigenous Water Ritual in Salar de 
Atacama, Chile’, Latin American Perspectives, 45/5 (2018), 170–85; F. M. Camacho, ‘Competing 
rationalities in water conflict: Mining and the indigenous community in Chiu Chiu, El Loa Province, 
northern Chile’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 33/1 (2012), 93–107. 
83 As at October 2019 there were 14 ‘Decretos de escasez hídrica’ [water scarcity Decrees] in 126 
‘comunas’  (The smallest territorial unit in the administration of Chile) in the regions of Coquimbo, 
Valparaíso, Metropolitana, O´Higgins y del Maule in Dirección General de Aguas, Decretos declaración 
zona de escasez vigentes, available at: 
http://www.dga.cl/administracionrecursoshidricos/decretosZonasEscasez/Paginas/default.aspx, last 
visited 27 November 2019. 
84 Budds J., La Demanda, Evaluación y Asignación del Agua en el Contexto de Escasez: un Análisis del 
Ciclo Hidrosocial del Valle del Río La Ligua, Chile’ [Demand, Evaluation and Managament of Water in 
the Context of Scarcity: an Analisis of the Hidrosocial Cycle of the Valley of La Ligua River, Chile] 




companies seek increasingly inventive ways to access water for their commercial 
activities, including developing major projects for desalinization of seawater.85  
In stark contrast to the dry and over-allocated north, the south of Chile 
experiences high levels of rainfall enabling a greater surface recharge, as well as having 
lakes, rivers, snow and glaciers that act as important water reserves, meaning that 
availability of water is higher than demand.86 The socio-environmental conflicts in these 
regions have historically been linked to major hydropower development,87 and the need 
to protect freshwater resources maintaining the state of free-flowing rivers.88 One of the 
most controversial water conflicts in Chile’s south concerned the (now discontinued)89  
Hydroaysen mega-project; 90  a 2.750-megawatt hydroelectric power development 
project comprising five dams in Patagonia - three on the Pascua river, and two on the 
 
Cuevas A., ‘La eco-geo-política del agua: una propuesta desde los territorios en las luchas por la 
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A proposal from the Territories in the Struggles for the Reclamation of Water in Petorca Province 
(Central Zone of Chile) 2018, 8(1) Revista Rupturas, at pp 167, 181. See also Bauer, ‘Water conflicts 
and entrenched governance problems in Chile’s market model’, 158. 
85 Servicio de Evaluación Ambiental, Sistema de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, available at:  
http://seia.sea.gob.cl/busqueda/buscarProyectoAction.php?nombre=desalinizadora, last accessed 27 
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the Region of Antofagasta, Chile] (1992) 19, Revista de Geografía Norte Grande, at p 3. 
86 Valdés-Pineda, Pizarro, García-Chevesich, Valdés, Olivares, Vera, Balocchi, Pérez, Vallejos, Fuentes, 
Abarza, and Helwig, ‘Water governance in Chile: Availability, management and climate change’. 
87 For an analysis of the interaction of water and energy law frameworks in Chile see Bauer, ‘Dams and 
Markets: Rivers and Electrical Power in Chile’. 
88 See Bauer, ‘Water conflicts and entrenched governance problems in Chile’s market model’, 159; D. 
Tecklin, C. Bauer, and M. Prieto, ‘Making environmental law for the market: the emergence, character, 
and implications of Chile’s environmental regime’, Environmental Politics, 20-File Attachments| 
(2011), 879–98. 
89 Annual Report Enel Chile 2017, available at: https://www.enel.cl/content/dam/enel-
cl/en/investors/enel-chile/reports/annual-reports/2017/Annual-Report_Enel-Chile_2017.pdf. 
90 See generally A. Berrizbeitia and T. Folch, ‘Colonizar las últimas fronteras: el potencial de los 
paisajes de energía en la Patagonia chilena’, ARQ (Santiago), (2015), 22–29. The Second Environmental 
Tribunal upheld the decision of the Environmental Impact Assessment Service not to approve the 
environmental impact evaluation. See Daniel Fernández Koprich on behalf of Centrales Hidroeléctricas 
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Baker river.91 Conflict between developers and the Government on one side and local 
communities and environmental activists on the other divided the country between those 
who believed that Hydroaysen was necessary for Chile’s energy security and those who 
saw freshwater resources as Chile’s most important asset to be protected for present and 
future generations.  
Throughout Chile, concern about the adequate protection and fair distribution of 
water continues, in the context of increasing pressure on water from industry (typically 
mining and hydroelectric development), irrigated agriculture and urbanisation. Concerns 
about the state of Chile’s water resources and the impact of development have also been 
voiced by Indigenous communities, including through resistance to water bottling 
operations and mining megaprojects in the north, and hydroelectricity developments in 
the south.92 Examples of this are the Pehuenche-Mapuche Indigenous opposition to the 
Ralco dam development in the South of Chile,93 and resistance to the Pascua Lama gold 
mining project by the Diaguita Huascoaltino Indigenous communities of northern 
Chile.94 
 
91 Chile's largest river by volume of water. Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, available at: 
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92 See Lovera D., ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Sale of Water Rights: The Case of Chile’ in Malcolm 
Langford and Anna FS Russell (eds), The Human Right to Water: Theory Practice, and Prospects 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017), at pp 84–112. 
93 See Lila Barrera-Hernández, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource Development: 
Chile’s Mapuche Peoples and the Right to Water’ (2005) 11(1) Annual Survey of International & 
Comparative Law. See also Davis, ‘Indigenous Rights and Modern Water Management in Chile’, 8. 
94 See Aguilar  G., ‘Pascua Lama, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: A Chilean Case Through the 
Lens of International Law’ (2013) 5 Gottingen Journal of International Law at pp 215, 245–246 Fuentes 
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Looking to the future, Chile is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change, and it has been acknowledged that Chile’s main challenge in terms of climate 
change mitigation, adaptation and resilience concerns the use and management of 
freshwater resources.95 The latest data, from the World Resources Institute, places Chile 
18th amongst the World’s countries under water stress, with a ‘high baseline of water 
stress’;96 a situation exacerbated by the effects of climate change.  
Water in Chile, as in many other countries, is subject to increasing conflict, as 
the status of water rights as private ‘property’ (discussed below), and the lack of 
institutional capacity or willingness to regulate, undermine the potential for 
transformative change needed to secure the protection of freshwater resources for 
present and future generations.  In this context, and in the context of increasing concern 
about additional pressures to be placed on Chile’s water resources through climate 
change, there is a need for robust and comprehensive water planning to protect 
environmental and cultural interests.  
 
4. ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS IN CHILE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKTHE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSince the time of Spanish colonisation, Chile’s 
political and social history has been characterised by ideological extremes and 
constitutional contrasts, including socialist governments focused on progressive social 
reform from the late 1960s and a conservative (and later neoliberal) military 
 
95 Santibáñez F., El cambio climático y los recursos hídricos de Chile: La Transición hacia la Gestión 
del agua en los nuevo escenarios climático de Chile [Climate Change and Freshwater Resources of 
Chile: the transition to water management in the new climatic scenarios of Chile] (Ministerio de 
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dictatorship from 1973 until 1990. Throughout Chile’s history, the allocation and 
exercise of rights to use water and the power of governments to regulate that use have 
been contentious constitutional matters; symptomatic of broader societal divisions 
about the role of the market and the public interest.97 
Chilean water law frameworks were overhauled during the dictatorship, as part 
of a wider project of neoliberal reform implemented by the military regime across a 
range of sectors,98 and accompanied by rapid growth in water related development such 
as mining and hydroelectricity.99  The new approach to water regulation, enshrined in a 
new Water Code of 1981, combined centralised water regulation with trade in water 
rights (called ‘derechos de aprovechamiento’), which could be transfered independent 
of land ownership in water markets. 
Under the Water Code, and in Chile’s established constitutional framework, 
waters are ‘bienes nacionales de uso publico’ (national property for public use).100 
However, the same declaration of water as public property allows the government to 
grant rights to use water, which amount to (constitutionally protected) private 
 
97 For a full discussion of the legal, political and social historical context to Chilean water law see the 
seminal work of C. J. Bauer, Siren Song: Chilean Water Law as a Model for International Reform, 
(Resources for the Future, 2004). For a discussion of the colonial origins of Chilean water law see A. 
Vergara Blanco, ‘Contribución a la Historia del Derecho de Aguas: Fuentes y Principios del Derecho de 
Aguas Chileno Contemporáneo (1818 – 1981)’ [Contribution to the History of Water Law: Sources and 
Principles of Contemporary Chilean Water Law (1818 - 1981)]’, Revista de Derecho de Minas y Aguas, 
1 (1989), 118.  
98 Marín, ‘Constitutional Challenges of the South: Indigenous Water Rights in Chile - Another Step in 
the “Civilizing Mission?’, 88. 
99 See generally Bauer C., Siren Song: Chilean Water Law as a Model for International Reform 
(Resources for the Future, 2004) at p 4; C. J. Bauer, Against the Current: Privatization, Water Markets, 
and the State in Chile, (Springer, 1998). 




property,101 equivalent to rights of absolute ownership.102 In fact, water rights enjoy the 
strongest form of property right available under Chilean law,103 described as an absolute, 
exclusive, and perpetual right to use, enjoy and dispose of a thing.104 The status of water 
rights differs greatly from rights to other resources in comparative Chilean concessional 
regimes,105 as water rights are granted in perpetuity, without cost.  
Constitutionally protected water rights may either be ‘created’ or ‘recognized’ 
by law. Water rights are ‘created’ where new rights are allocated to users by the General 
Water Directorate under the Water Code by way of an administrative concession, 
provided the applicant satisfies a number of formal and substantive requirements,106 
including proving the ‘availability of the resource’.107 They may also be ‘recognized’, 
either based on historical titles or via the judicial process of regularization, requiring 
applicants to prove uninterrupted productive use108 of the water since five years before 
the commencement of the Water Code (i.e. 1976), ‘without force or illegality’, and 
‘without recognising the rights of others’,109 in a process reminiscent of the doctrine of 
adverse possession at common law. 110  The regularization process was originally 
 
101Constitución Política de La República de Chile [Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile] 1980 
(‘Constitution’) art 19(24). 
102See Código Civil de La República de Chile [Civil Code of the Republic of Chile] 1855 (‘Civil Code’) 
(Chile), at art 589(2) for the incidents of ownership or ‘propiedad’ in Chilean civil law.  
103 Ibid art 577. 
104 Ibid art 582. 
105  For example, aquaculture, maritime, public works and sanitary concessions only apply for a limited 
period, usually involve a fee, and are subject to more regulatory control.   
106 Water Code art 20. See generally, Vergara A., Derecho de Aguas [Water Law] (Editorial Jurídica de 
Chile, 1998) Vol II, at p 321.   
107 Water Code art 141. 
108 Decree Law 2.603 1979. 
109Water Code trans art 2. 
110 The Chilean Courts have applied the process of regularisation in conjunction with article 7 of Decree 
Law 2.603 1979, which deemed the person making ‘uso efectivo’, or ‘productive use’, of a water right to 
be its owner. See, eg, Comunidad Atacamena Toconce con Essan SA [2004] Corte Suprema [Supreme 




intended to be a transitional measure to encourage a complete water register necessary 
to encourage water markets after the enactment of the 1981 Water Code, however 
regularization cases have continued. The regularization process has in parts of Chile 
been used to recognise the customary water rights of Indigenous communities as well as 
ongoing use by other historical users and register their water rights,111 discussed below, 
which presents particular challenges for forward water planning.  Finally, already 
allocated water rights may be purchased from other users by private bargaining in water 
markets. 
Water use rights are merely classified as ‘consumptive’ or ‘non-consumptive’,112 
with no priorities for various uses, such as human consumption, environmental interests 
or cultural uses. Until 2005, applicants for new water rights were not required to specify 
their intended use of water. Since an amendment in 2005, there has been a requirement 
in articles 131-2 of the Water Code to explain proposed use for applications above a 
certain flow, although the proposed use is not binding. In any event, in order to facilitate 
water markets, water users may change their use of water at any time, say from small-
scale agriculture to mining or eco-tourism to hydro generation, although such changes 
in use are understood to be rare in practice as are market transfers.113    
The status of freshwater resources as ‘national goods for public use’ has typically 
been construed as meaning that, rather than being directly owned, they are allocated by 
 
111 See generally Macpherson, n. Error! Bookmark not defined. above, at pp 176–200. See also 
Agüero F, Costa E. & Garcia V., ‘Diagnóstico de dificultades legal y reglamentarias relativas al catastro 
público de aguas’ [Diagnosis of the legal and regulatory challenges related to the Public Water Cadastre] 
(Report N° 28, Centro de Regulación y Competencia, Universidad de Chile, 29 July 2013), at p 44. 
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113 See C. J. Bauer, ‘Bringing Water Markets Down to Earth: The Political Economy of Water Rights in 
Chile, 1976-95’, Journal of World Development, 25-File Attachments|/5 (1997), 639–56, 652. Although 




the government pursuant to a concessional regime for their use and management.114 
However, the General Water Directorate has few regulatory powers for water, which it 
exercises sparingly.115  The model empowers private water user associations to ‘manage 
and distribute’ the various water rights in natural rivers at basin or semi-basin level in 
corporate organisations known as Juntas de Vigilancia (Water Monitoring Boards).116 
The Boards have ‘wide powers under the Water Code to monitor and manage the rivers 
within their control, including ensuring efficient water rights distribution, and protective 
and remedial measures to protect river health’.117 According to Rojas Calderón, these 
private Boards have the ‘public’ function of managing river distribution and health 
across the whole catchment,118 and Vergara argues that they have general powers for the 
governance and conservation of rivers,119 although as corporate entities accountable to 
private users as shareholders, it is doubtful that this public interest overrides any private 
benefit.120 
According to Bauer, weak capacity for water governance under the Chilean 
model has been ‘built into the institutional framework, which had been built primarily 
to protect private property rights and to allow free market transactions without 
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118 Christian Rojas Calderón, ‘Autogestión y Autorregulación Regulada de Las Aguas: Organizaciones 
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government interference’. 121  There is also a particular productivist logic to the 
government’s limited approach to regulation, which emphasises economic efficiency at 
the expense of environmental, social or cultural outcomes. Nahuelhual et al explain that 
the predominant view within Chile’s ‘weak’ institutional framework for water is that 
‘water is a natural resource disconnected from other components of the socio-ecological 
system’.122 The administrative focus is on access to water and its most efficient use, 
while ‘no formal rules regard the protection of forests or watershed heads as key 
ecosystems to maintain water provision and regulation’.123 
 
4.2  MINIMUM FLOWS UNDER THE WATER CODE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
The 1981 Water Code did not contemplate the environmental implications of the 
management of water and the protection of freshwater ecosystems. When the system of 
water regulation established under the Water Code was established there was no specific 
allocation of water to the environment and no reference to environmental flows.124 This 
was despite the fact that Chile’s Constitution protects:125 
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passage of the Ley Sobre Bases Generales de Medio Ambiente 1994 (N° 19.300) (Environmental Law), 
discussed below, which created a legal framework to support the Constitutional right to a clean and 
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The right to like in an environment free of contamination. It is the obligation of the 
State to ensure that this right is not affected and to uphold the preservation of nature. 
The law may establish specific restrictions on certain rights or freedoms in order to 
Project the environment. 
The constitutional protection of environmental rights has been interpreted in the 
Chilen scholarship as requiring the State to react appropriately to activities that 
undermine the preservation of nature, 126  and take action before any infringement, 
enshrining a ‘precautionary approach’ in Chilean environmental law.127 
The lack of an express legislative requirement for minimum ecological flows did 
not preclude their establishment, and the General Water Directorate began creating them 
for specific projects or activities as early as 1982,128  with different criteria applied 
depending on the area to be protected or the characteristics of the case.129  Until 1993, 
there were up to ten projects involving environmental flow rates established each year 
in the central and southern regions of Chile, which specified an amount of water that 
must not be extracted from the river by the holder of the water right. However the 
practice of applying minimum ecological flows operated in a discretionary and 
unsystematic way.130  
In the absence of an express provision, the General Water Directorate relied on 
a number of regulatory powers with respect to water as implied authority to establish the 
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first minimum flows. These included, foremost, the constitutional right to a clean and 
healthy environment, discussed above. The Directorate also took authority from the 
public interest in water management, given the status of waters as bienes nacionales de 
uso público (national property of public use) under the Water Code and Civil Code.131   
The General Water Directorate has taken further mandate from its powers under articles 
299(a) and 300(a) of the Water Code (to plan the development of freshwater resources; 
implement necessary measures to prevent and avoid the exhaustion of aquifers; and 
regulate to ensure the correct application of the law) to authorize a general regulatory 
role for environmental water. However, again, the environmental flows have been 
applied in a discretionary and ad hoc manner.  
The Directorate ordered the first Chilean study on environmental flows in 
1993,132 which provided some information about the ecological state of rivers in certain 
regions. The study proposed ‘reasonable limits’ on the extraction of freshwater resources 
in those rivers, applying various legislative requirements and methodologies, however, 
reached no accepted methodology on how to determine minimum environmental flows, 
and states that the choice of specific method and technology will depend on the 
circumstances of the case.133 
The power of the Directorate to establish minimum ecological flows has been 
variously challenged in the courts, on the basis that no express positive law provides for 
it. Two well-known cases involve the Maipo river basin in Chile’s central region, where 
 
131 See generally Vergara A. y Rivera D., ‘Legal Institutional Frameworks of Water Resources’ in 
Donoso G.  (Ed.) Water Policy in Chile, Global Issues in Water Policy 21 (2018) at p 111.  
132 R&Q Ingeniería, ‘Caudales ecológicos en regiones IV, V y Metropolitana. Encomendado por: 
Departamento de Conservación y Protección de Recursos Hídricos. Dirección General de Aguas.’ 
[Environmental Flows in the IV, V, and Metropolitan Region. Study ordered by the Department of 
Conservation and Protection of Freshwater Resources. General Water Directorate] 1993. 




a technical report commissioned by the Directorate in May 2003 concluded that now 
new water rights should be created in the three sections of the Maipo river and 
recommended the establishment of minimum ecological flows.134  
The first of these cases was the 2005 Supreme Court casación en el fondo (similar 
to judicial review in the common law sense) of Aguas Chacabuco v Dirección General 
de Aguas.135 The case concerned an application by a private company (Aguas Chacabuco 
S.A.) for consumptive water rights to take and use water from a wetland near Santiago. 
The Directorate had denied the request on the basis that the May 2003 study confirmed 
that there was insufficient water in the Maipo basin for the grant of new water rights. 
The company argued that the Directorate had no power to refuse the application, as the 
applicant had satisfied all requirements of the Water Code, and in particular that the 
Directorate had no power take into account minimum ecological flows when 
determining whether there was ‘availability of the resource’ as required by article 141 
of the Water Code. The Supreme Court confirmed the Directorate’s power to refuse the 
application for a water right, as there was insufficient water available for the right to be 
granted. 136  In doing so, the Court emphasised the right to a clean and healthy 
environment in article 19(8) of the Constitution,137 and pointed to the requirement for 
public authorities to protect conservation and biodiversity in articles 41 and 42 of the 
 
134 Dirección General de Aguas, ‘Evaluacion de los Recursos Hídricos Superficiales en la Cuenca del 
Rio Maipo. Informe Tecnico realizado por: Departamento de Administracion de Recursos Hidricos’ 
[Evaluation of Superficial Freswater Resources in the Waterbasin of Maipo River. Report Developed by 
the Departament of Managament of Freswater Resources] Report S.D.T N° 145 (May 2003). 
135 Aguas Chacabuco v Dirección General de Aguas, Supreme Court, Rol: 4224-2004 (31 October 2005) 
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136 Aguas Chacabuco v Dirección General de Aguas [4], referring to the requirement in art 141 of the 
Water Code that there exist sufficient availability of the resource for the grant of new water rights. 




Environmental Law (referred to below), as well as a general and inherent power for the 
Directorate to set aside minimum flows under the Water Code.138  
The second case was the 2006 Supreme Court decision Olga Prieto Poklepovic 
v Dirección General de Aguas,139 concerning an application for a right to take and use 
water from the Mapocho River, a tributary of the Maipo. Based on the May 2003 
technical report, the Directorate had denied the application on the basis of insufficient 
water being available. The Court, for the same reasons given in the Chacabuco case, 
affirmed the Directorate’s power to deny the application and maintain minimum 
ecological flows, explaining:140 
…in determining whether or not there is availability of a water resource, the General 
Water Directorate is not only empowered to consider the existence of ecological 
flows at the moment of establishing whether or not there is availability of the 
resource, rather it is obligated to do so, given that it must respect what is established 
by the Environmental Law, which accords with article 22 of the Water Code…. All 
of the above follows from the quality of waters as national property of public use, 
according to article 5 of the Water Code together with articles 589 and 595 of the 
Civil Code, which means that their ownership and use belongs to all the nation. The 
State, being responsible for their administration, must ensure that [water] is 
permanently destined for the common use.  
Minimum flows have also been established under the Environmental Law, passed 
in 1994 (here referred to as ‘environmental flows’ to distinguish them from minimum 
ecological flows set by the Directorate). 141  Article 41 of the Environmental Law 
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141 Ley 19.300 Sobre Bases Generales del Medio Ambiente 1994 [Law 19.300 on General 




established that natural renewable resources (which, for the purposes of the Law, 
includes water) must ‘be used in a way that ensures their potential to regenerate and their 
associated biological diversity’.142 Article 42 goes on to require the Ministry for the 
Environment and all public organisms involved in the regulation of natural resource use 
to secure their conservation, referring specifically to the maintenance of water flows and 
the conservation of their beds. The Environmental Law also introduced the main 
regulatory instruments now available for water quality management, which include: 
environmental water quality standards; emission standards; decontamination plans and 
strategies; and environmental impact assessments for new projects or activities.143 
Under the Environmental Law, environmental flows have at times been set on a 
case by case basis as part of the environmental impact assessment process for major 
projects established under the Law. The Sistema de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental 
[Environmental Impact Assessment System] is a procedure designed to assess the 
environmental impact of development projects or activities that need a permit to operate 
(called an environmental qualification resolution or ‘RCA’).144 If the project or activity 
includes one or more of the activities set out in article 10 of the Environmental Law, an 
Estudio de Impacto Ambiental [Environmental Impact Assessments] is required.  
If the project will produce one or more of the impacts set out in article 11 of the 
Environmental Law and, specifically, could impact on freshwater resources, the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Service is authorised to set minimum environmental 
flows, as mitigation measures. 145  For example, in the hydroelectric Project 
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Perquilauquén, in the Biobío region, the Service established minimum environmental 
flows and additional water rights (0,109 m3/s) that the company will have to leave in-
stream for other downstream users (called a ‘caudal pasante’). 146  Since 2016, the 
Service has operated under a specific guideline for setting environmental flows for 
hydroelectric projects, 147  which adopts the 2007 Brisbane Declaration definition of 
environmental flows and incorporates an ‘integral vision of the water system’ 
incorporating human uses of the system, in distinction from the minimum ecological 
flows set by the DGA, which are based only on hydrological criteria.148 
The Service’s power to institute minimum environmental flows has been 
criticised, on the basis that it duplicates the functions of two separate government 
institutions and creates ambiguity around the nature and scope of environmental 
flows.149  In practice, however, the Service has rarely departed from the approach for 
setting proposed minimum ecological flows recommended by the General Water 
Directorate,.150 At the same time, the Service is not legally bound by the current limits 
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Perquilauquén Pass Hydroelectric Centre Project] (0851/2014, Santiago, 26 September 2014) 
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149 Jaeger P., ‘Caudales ecológicos mínimos y proyectos hidroeléctricos’ [Minimum Ecological Flows 
and Hydroelectric Proyects], in Derecho Ambiental en Tiempos de Reforma. Acta de las V Jornadas de 
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imposed by the Directorate for minimum ecological flows,151 and the Service could in 
fact enhance the protection of freshwater resources, by taking into account other 
elements that might not be considered as part of the Directorate’s methodology in 
determining minimum environmental flows. 
Since 1994, the General Water Directorate has systematically applied minimum 
ecological flows when granting new water rights. Its approach has been to set a minimum 
environmental reserve for surface watercourses, and only grant future applications for 
water rights for flows above this level.152 In 2002, the Directorate passed a regulation 
entitled the ‘Manual of Regulation and Procedures for the Management of Freshwater 
Resources’ to provide detailed guidelines around the setting of environmental flows, 
including a hydrological method for determining minimum ecological flows.153 The 
method typically requires a minimum ecological flow of ten per cent of the annual 
average flow and 50 per cent of the minimum dry season flow across the 95th percentile 
of years (Q 95 per cent).154 
In 2005, after thirteen years of debate before the Parliament, a reform to the 
Water Code was finally passed (Law N° 20.017).155 The amendment was hard-won, with 
pro-market right-wing interests in fierce opposition to left-wing proponents of more 
interventionist reforms.156 Without altering the neoliberal ideology behind the Water 
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Code, the 2005 amendment formally introduced a requirement to set minimum 
ecological flows in the process of granting new water rights, confirming the loose 
practice that the Directorate had followed since 1982. New article 129 bis 1 of the Water 
Code, provided that:  
in granting water rights, the General Water Directorate should ensure nature’s 
preservation and environmental protection, establishing to that end a minimum 
ecological flow, that will only affect newly granted water rights, and should also 
consider the relevant natural conditions for each surface source. 
The amendment did not provide a definition of ‘minimum ecological flow’, but 
provided that they may not amount to more than 20 per cent of the average annual flow 
rate in the corresponding watercourse.157 The amendment also provided an exception 
allowing the President of the Republic, following a favourable report of Ministry of 
Environment, to issue a Decree specifying a different minimum ecological flow, which 
could be higher than the legal limit of 20 per cent, but less than 40 per cent of the average 
annual flow rate in the corresponding watercourse.158  
The legislation did not provide a methodology or procedure for calculating 
minimum ecological flows, and therefore did not provide any reason to depart from the 
criteria previously used by the Directorate (in the 2002 Manual). However, in 2008 the 
Directorate approved a new Manual for Management of Freshwater Resources, which 
introduced a new rule that changing the point of capture of water under an existing water 
right would be treated as establishing a new water right, allowing the Directorate to apply 
a minimum ecological flow. The Directorate did so by applying a broad interpretation 
of article 163 of the Water Code, which provides that approval is required to change the 
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location of a water collection or extraction point. This interpretation was controversial 
and has been challenged more than once in court.159 However, the Supreme Court in the 
2012 case of Sergio Menichetti Cuevas v Dirección General de Aguas agreed with the 
approach taken by the General Water Directorate in setting minimum ecological flows 
in relation to a request for a change of capture point, and emphasised the important role 
the Directorate should play in protecting freshwater resources, as follows:160 
This is a restriction that, moreover, is the obligation of the authority, in order to give effect 
to article 41 of the Environmental Law, which provides that the use and enjoyment of 
renewable natural resources must be carried out in a way that ensures their capacity for 
regeneration and the biological diversity associated with them. This is particularly 
important in the case of species that are at risk of extinction, vulnerable, rare or 
insufficiently understood, and is required to be followed by all public services concerned 
with the maintenance of environmental flows and the conservation of their beds. 
Despite the developing regulatory framework in Chile to protect environmental 
flows, there is still strong resistance from industry and commercial sectors to the 
application of minimum flows to pre-existing water rights, as well as inadequate exercise 
of regulatory power by the Directorate. 161  The opponents of environmental flows 
fiercely defend their constitutionally protected private property rights to water, in direct 
opposition to the constitutionally mandated responsibility and power of the State to 
protect freshwater ecosystems.162 Given that most river basins in the North and Central 
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parts of Chile were fully allocated, and in some cases overallocated,163 since before the 
2005 reform and in some cases since before the commencement of the Water Code, the 
potential reach of minimum ecological flows for the grant of new water rights is 
significantly limited.164 
Another amendment introduced by the 2005 water reforms had the perverse 
outcome of disincentivizing the protection of environmental water in-stream. This was 
the introduction of annual taxes for instances of non-use of water rights,165 designed to 
protect against water speculation and ensure parties who hold the rights to make use of 
them for their stated purpose.166  ‘Non-use’ is assumed where there are no water capture 
works,167 such as canals or irrigation systems, and a number of provisions in the Water 
Code set out the process for charging the taxes. For non-consumptive water rights, the 
Water Code provides an exception for small, localized volumes of less than 100 litres 
per second in the drier regions in northern Chile and the Metropolitan Region or 500 
litres per second in regions south of Santiago. 168   However, as a general matter if 
someone wanted to ‘not use’ their water rights for productive purposes and instead leave 
them in-stream for conservation purposes, and therefore could not point to the necessary 
water infrastructure, they would be required to pay fines under the legislation.  ‘Fees for 
non use’ have also been challenged in the courts, generally by those seeking exceptions, 
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or the expansion of existing exception categories,169 including in the case of Indigenous 
communities under the Indigenous Law, discussed below. 
Where minimum flows can be established, there are a number of other matters 
that significantly undermine their potential to protect or restore aquatic ecosystems. The 
first of these is a lack of adequate information about the state of particular waterways, 
and their various uses (discussed above), making it very difficult for the Directorate or 
Service to accurately set or maintain appropriate levels for minimum flows. In order to 
manage and protect freshwater resources, regulatory institutions must have accurate 
information about the state of water resources and an understanding of the number of 
right holders, the nature of their rights, and the number of users extracting water from a 
river without any permit (or at least a mechanism to penalise unlawful use). However, 
the General Water Directorate has incomplete data on the actual state of waterways or 
their users in Chile for a number of reasons. These include because, as mentioned above, 
water rights can come into being not only via administrative grant, but also where 
recognised by the courts in the process of regularization, which may retrospectively 
recognise ‘historical’ water users as legitimate rightholders, without any prior 
accounting. Further, many historical water users resist regularizing their water rights 
with the Directorate’s Public Cadastre of Water to avoid being levied fees for non-use, 
despite campaigns by the Directorate to encourage regularizations, meaning that ‘illegal’ 
water use is widespread.170 Water rights are also transferable within water markets, and 
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there is no enforceable mechanism to register water rights and transferences, making it 
extremely difficult for the water authority keep track of many of them.171  
 Second, under the current regime, new water users bear the burden of ensuring 
minimum flow rates in order to protect freshwater ecosystems. Established water right 
holders continue using water resources without any limitation, despite never having paid 
for their rights. This situation raises concerns about equity in water regulation, 172 
especially when combined with the impacts drought and climate change present, 
diminishing considerably the amount of water available in the riverbed. Politicians, 
industry and productive sectors continue to resist any sort of redistribution or abrogation 
of water rights, pointing to constitutionally protected right to property. In debates 
surrounding the 2005 reforms, these sectors expressed fear that the obligation to 
establish a minimum ecological flow for pre-existing water rights would amount to a 
retroactive application of the law, which was, in effect, an expropriation of private 
property rights.173  
Chilean environmental institutions have also conceived of and developed 
environmental flow methodologies and policies in a particularly limited way. The 
Brisbane Declaration defines environmental flows as not only ‘the quantity, timing and 
quality of freshwater flows and level necessary to sustain aquatic ecosystems’, but as 
supporting other uses, including cultural uses and well-being.174 However, the Chilean 
minimum flows framework has much more limited objectives geared towards the 
‘preservation of nature’ and ‘to establish the natural conditions relevant to each 
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superficial flow’.175 The focus in Chile has been only on the minimum amount of water 
‘needed’ in the river, with no reference to quality, and excluding other factors that could 
influence that ecological value, like landscape, tourism, social or cultural uses, 176 
relevant to enhance the river’s value more broadly. Nor does the hydrological method 
used by the General Water Directorate account for the interaction of surface water 
resources with groundwater, necessary for an accurate understanding of complete 
aquatic ecosystems. 
Finally, instead of establishing a minimum percentage of water to be kept in 
stream as an ecological flow and placing a cap on extractions, the Chilean legislation 
sets a maximum limit for the minimum ecological flow, which may not be greater than 
20 per cent of the average annual flow rate in the corresponding watercourses or 40 per 
cent in exceptional cases. These rules transform the minimum ecological flow into a 
negative restriction on the amount of water that can be protected within the river, 
inconsistent with the original purpose of environmental flows as a protective target. The 
legal limits on flows established do not appear to be based on any defensible 
methodology,177 and more water, above the 40 per cent average annual flow rate, may 
in fact be necessary or desirable to restore and ensure a healthy river ecosystems and 
uses of the water flowing through it. 
 
4.3 INDIGENOUS WATER RIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS 
As well as concerns about the environmental state of Chile’s rivers, there is growing 
concern voiced by Indigenous communities about the unfair distribution and poor 
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management of Chile’s water resources.178 The Chilean Indigenous population makes 
up approximately 12.8 per cent of the total population, within nine Indigenous ethnicities 
recognised by the Indigenous Law, 179  all of which are culturally and linguistically 
distinct.180 The Indigenous peoples living within the territory now known as Chile have 
been subject to widespread historical injustice and dispossession of their traditional lands 
and resources. 181  Their territorial rights are now recognised, to a limited extent, in 
domestic and international law, including ILO Convention 169, which Chile has 
ratified.182  
Indigenous relationships and interests with water resources in Chile are both 
distinctive and variegated, although there is a clear emphasis on spiritual as well as 
economic water values and a territorial approach to land and water connectivity.183 
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According to Babidge, who has conducted recent anthropological research on 
Indigenous communities’ water use and interactions with mining companies and 
government in northern Chile, Indigenous water interests are characterised by ‘complex 
waterscapes, where neither ‘rights’ nor ‘values’ capture the totality of Indigenous 
interests and processes’, which include social, cultural, spiritual, economic and 
environmental dimensions.184 
The term ‘cultural flow’ (or ‘caudal cultural’ in Spanish) is not used in Chilean 
law or commentary, although there is some acknowledgment of the social or cultural 
dimensions of the environment in in the Chilean legal framework. The Environmental 
Law, for example, defines the ‘environment’ as:185 
The global system comprised of natural and artificial elements of a physical, chemical 
or biological nature, sociocultural elements and their interactions, in permanent 
modification by human or natural activities, and which regulate and affect the 
existence and development of life in its multiple manifestations. 
However, Indigenous peoples’ water use enjoys no mention in the Chilean 
legislative provisions or policy frameworks for environmental flows, neither for 
productive nor environmental uses. This is despite the fact that Chile does have a 
comparatively strong legislative basis for allocating water use rights for Indigenous 
peoples’ use for a range of purposes, under the Indigenous Law 1993.186  
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Article 64 of the Indigenous Law protects the rights of Aymara and Atacameña 
Indigenous communities from northern Chile to waters in their traditional lands, 
providing: 
The waters of the Aymara and Atacameña communities must be especially protected. 
Waters, including rivers, canals, streams and springs, found on the lands of the 
Indigenous communities established by this law will be considered property of 
ownership and use of the Indigenous communities, without prejudice to the rights that 
other right holders have registered in accordance with the Water Code. 
New water rights must not be granted over lakes, ponds, springs, rivers and other aquifers 
that supply waters owned by the various Indigenous communities established by this law 
without first guaranteeing normal water supply to the affected communities.  
The protection of Indigenous water rights in article 64 was introduced for a 
number of reasons, including in recognition of distinctively cultural indigenous water 
interests as territorial rights connected to land, and as an attempt to halt or reverse the 
obstruction of indigenous water access by other interests.187 
These are referred to as ‘ancestral’ water rights and are equivalent to rights of 
ownership in the common law sense and protected as property by the Constitution.188 
Consistent with typical conceptions of Indigenous resource rights in international 
debates, the rights recognised by article 64 are communal in nature, which in Prieto’s 
words, ‘completely changed the institutional framework through which water could be 
managed in the Atacameño area, departing from the 1981 Water Code’s logic and 
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opening the possibility of collectivization’.189 Although article 64 refers specifically to 
the Aymara and Atacameña communities, it has been relied on to protect or recognise 
the rights of other Indigenous communities in Chile to access and use water.190 
In order to obtain recognition of such ancestral rights, an Indigenous community 
may apply to the court for the regularization of their historical water use as a water right 
pursuant to both article 64 of the Indigenous Law 1993 and transitional article 2 of the 
Water Code.191 To do so, the community must satisfy the requirements of article 64 as 
well as the additional requirements to prove historical use since 1976 in the 
regularization process, discussed above.192 The evidence put forward to accredit such 
use typically refers to the existence of ancient water infrastructure for irrigated 
agriculture, like canals or terraces.193 As a consequence, ancestral water rights have 
typically been recognised in reliance on article 64 for the consumptive use of surface 
waters only, due to the difficulty of proving productive use that is non-consumptive or 
involves groundwater in the absence of water infrastructure.194 Indigenous communities 
would be unlikely to be successful in an application for regularization of historical water 
use for environmental or conservation purposes where the objective is to leave the water 
in-stream.195 
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Because much of the surface flows of Chilean rivers had already been fully 
allocated by the time the Indigenous Law was enacted, the Law also set up a 
redistributive measure; a Fund to finance the acquisition of water rights for Indigenous 
communities (the Indigenous Land and Water Fund). 196  This includes funding 
regularization cases, and the necessary production of expert evidence and legal and court 
fees, but the Fund has been also used to finance the constitution and purchase of water 
rights for Indigenous groups throughout Chile. Like ancestral water rights protected by 
article 64, water rights acquired with the support of the Fund are the same as the 
consumptive water rights held by any other user (constitutionally protected property 
rights), subject to the proviso that they cannot be transferred separately from the land to 
any non-Indigenous user for 25 years unless the fund is repaid.197   
However, as is the case with ancestral water rights protected by article 64 of the 
Indigenous Law, Indigenous communities have only benefitted from the Fund where 
they can prove historical use and ongoing intent to use water for productive, usually 
agricultural, purposes. The government’s intention has always been that the Fund will 
support the economic development of Indigenous lands,198 and regulations prescribing 
the factors the government must consider before granting subsidies for water rights 
acquisition specifically refer to the agricultural benefits from irrigation for the lands 
affected.199 Again, it is unlikely that an Indigenous community could access water rights 
with the support of the Fund for instream environmental or conservation purposes. 
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Aside from these two main water provisions, two provisions were added to the 
Indigenous Law as part of a minor amendment to the Water Code in 1992, in response 
to concerns about the over extraction of aquifers by mining interests in Chile’s north.200 
These prohibit (without express permission) explorations and extractions of groundwater 
from aquifers that supply certain wetlands of particular significance to Indigenous 
communities in the north of Chile,201 indirectly protecting the flow of these areas of 
importance to the Indigenous peoples.  However, Yañez and Molina suggest that these 
protections may have come too late for some northern wetlands, which had already been 
over-extracted by mining interests by 1992.202  
A major limitation of the legal regime for recognition and allocation of 
Indigenous water rights in Chile is the failure of the Government to prospectively plan 
for and comprehensively provide for Indigenous water use. Regularization cases are ad 
hoc and depend on government funding and support, and depend the varied reasoning 
and approach of judges, 203  producing a ‘patchwork’ 204  of Indigenous water rights 
throughout the country. Where water rights are already allocated to other users, a lack 
of prospective planning now leaves little potential to set aside a flow for Indigenous use 
without some form of redistribution. As mentioned, the processes for allocating water 
rights to Indigenous groups also favours productive water uses, and there is little to no 
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incidence of Indigenous communities being allocated a share of water for cultural or 
conservation interests alone.  
From 2005 until 2014 Indigenous communities who did not use their water rights 
for productive purposes could also be charged the tax for ‘non-use’ referred to above if 
they could not show the necessary water capture infrastructure, further disincentivizing 
environmental or conservation water protection. In 2014 the Supreme Court held that, in 
certain circumstances, Indigenous communities can acquire water rights over in-stream 
flows and retain them without having to extract freshwater resources, nor pay a fine for 
non-use of the resource.205 The Court’s legal reasoning was that fees for non-use could 
not be levied against Indigenous communities holding water rights acquired with finance 
from the Indigenous Land and Water Fund because to do so would constitute an 
‘alienation’ of such rights, in contravention of section 22 of the Indigenous Law. 
However, the judgment does not engage with the broader context, or consider the 
implications and broader recognition of Indigenous water values and interests, 
environmental or conservation aspirations, or the ecological benefits of leaving water in-
stream. The Court’s decision was followed by a proposal for a regulatory exemption to 
the taxes for non-use for small agricultural and peasant communities and Indigenous 
peoples, although the proposed amendment was not approved and has since been 
archived, leaving ongoing uncertainly for Indigenous water users.206 
Despite the limitations of the Chilean Indigenous water provisions, Indigenous 
peoples do have constitutionally protected water rights in Chile, and at a minimum these 
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should be taken into account when planning and implementing environmental water 
management approaches, including environmental flows. In these circumstances there is 
a clear need for meaningful engagement with Indigenous communities in Chile around 
their water rights, needs and aspirations. All institutions involved in environmental water 
regulation need to ‘understand Indigenous water values, connections, and relationships 
at the appropriate scales’, and design approaches that ‘better accommodate multiple and 
often conflicting ways of interacting with, valuing, and relating to rivers’.207 Chilean 
Indigenous scholar, Marín, has emphasised this challenge not only in terms of inclusive 
water governance and planning, but as a constitutional challenge, requiring the 
redistribution of resources rights and decision-making power:208 
Under the neo-liberal frame, the constitutional debate over Atacameños or Aymara water rights 
Needs more than the mere acceptance of pluralism; recognition in the new Constitution needs to 
pursue the redistribution of power and resources between the Chilean state and Indigenous People 
through constitutional law. 
 
4.4 WATER REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS  
 Chilean governments have now revisited the Water Code several times, and numerous 
draft reform proposals have been developed, and shelved.209 The most recent substantial 
reform proposal was introduced in 2011 by a group of Parliamentarians, drawing 
together a number of reforms proposed between 1992 and 2011. 210  In 2014, the 
Government amended this project and presented a new consolidated water reform 
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project, which is still before Parliament. 211  Amongst other objectives, the reform 
proposal sought to strengthen the Government’s oversight role with respect to water, and 
incentivise more equitable distribution of water rights. The Government presented the 
reform proposal with the message:212 
Our legislation, from early on, has maintained that ‘waters are goods of public use’. 
However, it is unconceivable that this statement becomes a dead letter: it is necessary 
to provide it with substance.  
The main reforms proposed by the Government included a changed status for 
new water rights, from perpetual to temporary (30 years, extendable) and the expiration 
of water rights for non-use (4-8 years depending if they are consumptive or non-
consumptive). The reforms would also: allow the Government to limit the exercise of 
water rights in the public interest, reducing them temporarily or redistributing water 
rights; introduce a priority for the use of water for human consumption and sanitation; 
prohibit the constitution of new water rights in National Parks and Virgin Region 
Reserves; limit the grant of water rights in other protected areas; and strengthen certain 
regulatory powers of the General Water Directorate.  
The Government continued to work on and make changes to the project,213 but 
the proposal was significantly expanded after Michelle Bachelet and her centre-left 
coalition took office for the second time in 2014, via the legislative process. 214 
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Responding to ongoing water related protest and conflict in Chile, Bachelet had made 
an election promise to reform the Constitution and the Water Code as part of a broader 
project of social policy reform.215 
By 2016 the Lower House had added a recognition of the human right to water 
and sanitation to the reform proposal and introduced priority uses for water (Human 
consumption and sustainability of freshwater resources), allowing the Government to 
create ‘water reserves’ to ensure those priority uses.216 In terms of environmental flows, 
the Lower House inserted a provision that would extend the application of article 129 
bis 1 of the Water Code, requiring environmental flows to be set for all future water 
concessions, and allowed the Directorate to establish minimum ecological flows on 
water rights already allocated in those areas that the Ministry of Environment considered 
to be threatened, degraded or prioritized ecosystems or within ‘protected areas’.217 In 
addition, the Lower House added a provision to affirm the Directorate’s practice of 
applying minimum ecological flows where the holder proposes to change the point of 
water capture.  
The proposed reforms, as elaborated by Parliament, included new ‘use it or lose 
it’ rules, whereby water rights would become extinguishable after a period of non-use, 
extending and attempting to improve the system of taxes for non-use.218 This included 
extending the categories of exceptions to cases where right holders are Indigenous 
people or communities (recognizing recent jurisprudence from the Courts discussed 
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above);219 water rights that are ‘not used’ by rightholders to maintain ecological function 
in protected areas declared by the Ministry of Environment; and water rights used for 
recreational, tourism or other projects that don’t require water to be used or extracted 
from its source. 
The reform proposal also included further substantive provisions protecting 
Indigenous rights to water. At clause 5 the proposal provided:220 
In the case of indigenous territories, the State will ensure the integrity between land and 
water, and protect waters for the benefit of indigenous communities, in accordance with 
laws and international treaties ratified by Chile that are currently in force. 
This proposed amendment attempted to reverse the separation of water and land 
rights in Chilean water law frameworks,221 and adopt the logic of ILO Convention 169 
in relation to the integrity of Indigenous territory.222 Clause 5 left the door open to further 
interpretation in line with developing international commitments around environmental 
law and Indigenous rights, given its explicit reference to international law.223  
The reform proposal also included a prioritization of water use for human 
consumption and sanitation,224 in line with a shift back towards emphasising water as a 
bien nacional de uso publico (national property for public use) and reflecting ongoing 
concerns about priority of use and unfair distribution of water. However, there was little 
clarity in the proposal as to how the priority mechanism would work in practice. The 
 
219 Those referred to in article 5 (of the reform approved by the Lower House) and articles 2 and 9 of 
Law N° 19.253. 
220 Water Code Amendment Bill art 5 bis. 
221 Indigenous resistence to separation of land and water, in line with international and regional law and 
jurisprudence, has been emphasised since the development of the Indigenous Law. See Macpherson, n. 
Error! Bookmark not defined. above, at pp 161–210. 
222 ILO Convention 169 arts 6, 7. 
223 Water Code Amendment Bill art 5. 




proposal included a number of further exceptions to general principles for Indigenous 
communities, aside from fees for non-use, including exemptions from the five year limit 
on regularisations of water use rights,225 and exemptions from restrictions on exercising 
their water rights once a basin has been declared ‘exhausted’.226 
Although these Indigenous-specific protections looked promising, controversy 
surrounded the reform process and the Chilean Government was accused of failing to 
properly consult with Indigenous peoples. According to the then Director of the Chilean 
Water Directorate, the Parliamentary committees charged with developing the law 
reform proposal decided to leave the Indigenous protections out of early development of 
the reform project in order to avoid consulting with Indigenous peoples and consequent 
cost and delay.227 This suggests a clear disregard, not only for the legally protected rights 
Indigenous peoples have to water, but for the Indigenous right to consultation 
underscored in Chile’s commitment to ILO Convention 169,228 as well as domestic 
legislation around consultation with Indigenous peoples.229  
In any event, the Bachelet administration was unable to pass the reforms prior to 
a change of government in 2017, and as at 2020 it languishes before the Senate. The 
incumbent right-wing Piñera Government (returned for the second time in 2017) has, 
until recently, had little appetite for reforming water law away from a market-based logic. 
After taking office, President Piñera announced his opposition to the water reform 
project, arguing that it presents uncertainty and probable loss for the Chilean agricultural 
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sector.230 His new Government would instead provide security to water rights by re-
establishing the legal certainty of new and historical water rights as property. 231  
Meanwhile, it appeared, Indigenous and environmental water concerns would remain 
unresolved.  
In August 2017, the Special Committee of Freshwater Resources, Desertification 
and Drought, approved the reform proposal and passed it to the Agriculture Committee 
of the Senate. 232  In January 2019, the Government again amended the proposal, 233 
restating the central objectives of the reform proposal as: addressing water scarcity; 
improving legal certainty of water rights; prioritizing the use of water for human 
consumption; promoting non-extractive uses; strengthening private water user 
associations; streamlining processes for water infrastructure permits; preventing water 
rights speculation; and supporting better coordination between water authorities and 
users.234   
As re-modified by the Piñera Government, the proposal reinforced the status of 
water rights as perpetual, transferable and non-extinguishable. The proposal no longer 
referred to Indigenous peoples, dismissing the Lower House’s modification to article 5 
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to ensure the integrity between land and territory for Indigenous communities, and 
removing the exemption of Indigenous was users from fees for non-use.  
In terms of minimum ecological flows, the amended proposal stated, even though 
minimum flows may have achieved outcomes in the south of Chile ‘they are not the right 
tool to preserve those river basins where water rights have already been assigned in their 
entirety before 2005, nor to preserve groundwater’.235 It went on to acknowledge that 
‘under the current reforms there are no incentives to voluntarily preserve environmental 
water, due to the fact that non-use is fined via the tariff’.236 However, the Government’s 
analysis appeared to miss the point. The short-lived promise of the reform proposal was 
its potential to encourage, through legislation, the conservation of water in-stream, 
potentially even opening the way for international financial donors to buy and claim 
water rights to protect freshwater ecosystems. For the Government to declare that 
environmental flows do not work is ironic, given that their ineffectiveness to date has 
been caused by the Government’s unwillingness to address unnecessary legal limitations 
on environmental flows or to use all tools available to support environmental and cultural 
outcomes. These limitations have been compounded by the fact that when minimum 
ecological flows were introduced to legislation in 2005, most water rights in the Central 
and North macro regions of Chile were already fully allocated, and the Government has 
not been prepared to consider the prospect of reallocation of water to the environment. 
If passed, the Piñera Government’s minimal water reforms will at least grant a 
larger oversight role for the Directorate and provide more clarity around regarding fines 
for non-use. But the proposed reforms, as they stand, do not provide sufficient tools, 
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within the existing market-based regulatory framework, to encourage in-stream flow 
protection. Even these limited reform proposals have been met with strong opposition 
from commercial and industrial sectors including the mining, energy and agricultural 
sector, who argue they the reforms are misguided and infringe on the constitutional right 
to property. The Agricultural Committee of the Senate, during its discussions on the 
reforms heard various politicians, private sector and non-governmental organizations 
express their concerns, points of view, and observations on the evolving reform 
project.237 The first presentation was from the Minister of Agriculture, Antonio Walker, 
who declared that the reform was his priority project, emphasizing the risk that ‘a bad 
reform could slow down investment’, and explaining how important water is for the 
agricultural sector. 238  His Ministry supported him with concerns that the reforms 
proposed by the Lower House would detrimentally affect pre-existing and protected 
water rights.239 The National Society of Agriculture went even further and argued that 
the reform was unconstitutional, and that any attempt to apply environmental flows 
would retrospectively infringe constitutionally protected private property rights. Instead, 
the agricultural sector proposed ‘technical improvements’ and a review of 
administrative, management and technical processes within the Directorate.240  
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The water reform proposal continued to ‘stumble its way’ through the legislative 
process and the last session of the Agricultural Committee was held on 18 November 
2019, to discuss water scarcity.241 However, in the meantime, the neoliberal model 
underpinning the Chilean water regime has provoked new social contestation and 
constitutional crisis in Chile, beginning as recently as 18 October 2019. As part of this 
social protest and constitutional crisis, the project to modify the Constitution and related 
debates around the regulatory regime for water have been revived, in an effort to 
demonstrate the commitment of politicians to address the people’s demands.242  
On the morning of 15 November 2019, the Government announced, after many 
hours of discussion with members of the Parliament, an Agreement for Social Peace and 
a New Constitution.243 In this agreement, the Chilean Government has committed to hold 
a referendum on April  29th 2020 with the following two questions: 1. Do you want a 
new Constitution (Yes/No)? and 2. What type of authority/entity should write the new 
Constitution (Convención Mixta Constitutional or Convención Constitutional)?244 There 
are still many uncertainties in terms of the detail of the referendum process, but there is 
growing public debate and social mobilization around constitutional reform and the fair 
distribution of rights. Certainly article 19(24), and specifically the right to property over 
water rights, will play a key role in the discussions, and may have implications for the 
future of environmental flows in Chile. 
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5 TOWARDS HOLISTIC ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS IN CHILE 
There is now an international consensus around the need for environmental flow regimes 
to be implemented in domestic water law and policy frameworks in order to protect the 
health of rivers and waterways for future generations. Conceptions of environmental 
flows now acknowledge the social as well as ecological functions of environmental 
flows, and the need for environmental flow regimes to reflect and account for Indigenous 
water governance and rights. Advocates for an expanded conception of environmental 
flows are arguing for recognition of local and Indigenous governance frameworks and 
interests to build legitimacy in environmental flow regimes and water planning more 
broadly.245 Douglas et al provide a useful conceptual starting point for the design of a 
holistic environmental flow regime, which accounts for cultural as well as ecological 
interests.246 
The current model for environmental flows in Chile is not holistic. Although 
there is some legislative and policy provision for environmental flows, these are limited 
and have been implemented in an ad hoc manner. The minimum ecological flows 
instituted by the General Water Directorate, for example, are based on a restrictive 
hydrological model which fails to account for social or cultural water needs, or for the 
interdependence of surface water flows with groundwater. Further, the Directorate’s 
power to set minimum ecological flows only applies to the granting of new water rights, 
even though water had already been largely allocated to private users when the process 
begun. Meanwhile, the courts continue to regularize historical water uses, without 
 
245 See Douglas, Jackson, Canham, Laborde, Beesley, Kennard, Pusey, Loomes, and Setterfield, 
‘Conceptualizing Hydro-socio-ecological Relationships to Enable More Integrated and Inclusive Water 
Allocation Planning’, 362. 




considering the availability of water and without any sort of prospective planning. The 
minimum environmental flows set by the Environmental Impact Assessment Service are 
similarly restrictive, applying only to prospective major projects, while the vast majority 
of water rights in Chile have been allocated (free of charge) without any consideration 
of the interests of the environment, social or cultural interests.  Aside from the obligation 
to set minimum flows, and consistent with the minimal public approach to water 
regulation in Chile, there is very little policy guidance on how these flows are managed 
and protected by the Directorate, the Service, or private water user associations once 
they are established.  
Nor is there provision made, in the setting or management of environmental 
flows, for the significant legal rights and values of Indigenous peoples. If anything, 
Chilean water law frameworks disincentivize non-extractive environmental or cultural 
water uses, by charging fees for non-use where water right-holders wish to leave water 
in-stream. Indigenous peoples’ ‘complex waterscapes’ of social, cultural, spiritual, 
environmental and economic interests 247  are reflected in legislative protection of 
ancestral water rights (at least in the north of Chile, but arguably more broadly) and a 
Fund existing for the allocation of water rights elsewhere. Environmental flows are not 
a substitute for substantive water rights for Indigenous peoples for consumptive, 
productive or economic purposes, but should be implemented alongside existing 
mechanisms that fund the recognition and allocation of water rights for Indigenous 
peoples in Chile. 
We argue that the Chilean government should strive towards a comprehensive 
minimum flow regime in Chile, which protects environmental or ecological water 
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qualities to support ecosystem health and takes into account Indigenous rights and 
interests. There are multiple legal reasons why the government should do so. The 
Chilean institutions have in the past been prepared to rely on implied regulatory powers, 
and the Chilean courts have supported them in doing so, emphasising the important role 
public authorities have to play in protecting the environmental qualities of waterways. 
Our review of Chilean legal decisions has demonstrated that Supreme Court is prepared 
to uphold the provision of minimum environmental flows, pointing to the institutional 
obligation to manage the environment in the public interest and the constitutional right 
to a healthy environment, despite the impact on other water users. 
The role that the Chilean Government should take in environmental water 
management is inherent, in our view, in the characterisation of waters as ‘national goods 
for public use’. In this context, the public interest does not only encompass water use for 
industrial or commercial purposes and human consumption, but also to ensure healthy 
ecosystems and their preservation for future generations.248 It is also consistent with the 
obligations public authorities have to protect biodiversity and the environment under 
articles 41 and 42 of the Environmental Law and a range of regulatory imperatives in the 
Water Code. The Water Code requires the Directorate to consider the rights of ‘third 
parties’,249 when granting new water rights, which could include harm or impact to 
ecosystems, implying a duty for the water authority to take into account, when making 
their decision, the need for in-stream flows.250 Most significantly, the  duty to protect the 
environmental qualities of rivers, and develop an effective environmental flow regime, 
is also a constitutional mandate. The Constitution in article 19(8) protects the right to a 
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clean and healthy environment, and explicitly states that ‘the law many establish specific 
restrictions on certain rights or freedoms in order to protect the environment’. 
Environmental water governance should not be left to private water user associations, 
when it is a constitutional imperative and matter of public interest. 
There are also clear legal reasons why the Chilean institutions should plan for 
and include Indigenous peoples to ‘build legitimacy’ 251  in the implementation and 
management of environmental flows. Chile has ratified ILO Convention 169, with its 
protections of Indigenous territorial rights to natural resources. In the Chilean 
constitutional system, international human rights treaties are, at least in theory, ‘self-
executing’,252 meaning that the growing international consensus around the right to 
water, environmental rights, Indigenous rights, and even the rights of nature, may 
provide opportunities to influence local reform in Chile.253 
In terms of the grant of new water rights, there is nothing preventing either the 
General Water Directorate or the Environmental Impact Assessment Service from 
revising their approach to setting environmental flow requirements in a more holistic 
manner, to take into account ecosystem health and current and prospective Indigenous 
water uses and values. The Service, in particular, is not legally bound by the current 
limits imposed by the Directorate for minimum ecological flows,254 and could in fact 
enhance the protection of freshwater ecosystems by taking into account other elements 
 
251 Douglas, Jackson, Canham, Laborde, Beesley, Kennard, Pusey, Loomes, and Setterfield, 
‘Conceptualizing Hydro-socio-ecological Relationships to Enable More Integrated and Inclusive Water 
Allocation Planning’, 98. 
252 Constitution art 5(2).  
253 Recabarren O., ‘El Estándar del Derecho de Aguas desde la Perspectiva del Derecho Internacional de 
los Derechos Humanos y del Medio Ambiente’ [Water Law Standards from the perspective of the 
International Law of Human Rights and Environment] (2016) 14(2) Estudios Constitucionales, at pp 
305, 307. 





that might not be considered as part of the Directorate’s methodology. As the Supreme 
Court has emphasised, the government institutions should use their powers to conduct 
an adequate and effective minimum flow regime, in line with their obligations under the 
Constitution to uphold the right to a clean and healthy environment and various domestic 
laws. Nor is there anything preventing the institutions from working together with 
Indigenous peoples in the setting and management of environmental flows, and again, 
the Government should do this in line with its commitments under ILO Convention 169.  
 Where existing water users, including Indigenous communities, already hold 
water rights, and desire to leave those water rights in-stream for conservation, spiritual 
or cultural purposes it would be relatively straight-forward to allow them to do so, and 
to plan for this use within environmental flow regimes. Those users who leave river 
flows in-stream for environmental or cultural purposes should be exempt from paying 
fines for ‘non-use’, and, to promote certainly, this exemption should be prescribed by 
law. 
We acknowledge, that for Chile to move towards a holistic environmental flow 
regime would require significant public investment, and probably legislative reform.255 
Water regulation is generally contentious in Chile, because of the quantity and range of 
interests in Chile’s rivers, including those of productive users.256 In catchments where 
water rights are already fully or over allocated, some form of water recovery would be 
needed, and the prospect of buying-back rights is expensive. Gomez et al estimated in 
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2014 that the cost of buying-back water for environmental flows and pollution-dilution 
in the Maipo river would be $1.9M US dollars.257 However, they argued that this is more 
efficient way to manage pollution than other pollution-reduction alternatives, and point 
to a need for further consideration by Chilean policymakers of the social benefits of 
environmental water.258 
 Any sort of compulsory redistribution of water to the environment would impact 
already allocated water rights, meaning that the Government would need to amend 
article 129 bis 1 to remove the express restriction of minimum environmental flows to 
the granting of new water rights. This may imply a constitutional change, or an 
amendment to the protection of water rights as property under article 19(24) of the 
Constitution, requiring a two-thirds majority in the senate.259 Given Chile’s difficult 
history of water reform and entrenched water interests, it is a fair assessment that such a 
drastic reform is unrealistic, although more thinking needs to be done as to legal avenues 
for transformative change. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
Water resources in Chile are under increasing pressure and the available quantity and 
quality of water is likely to decrease further as populations grow, development 
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intensifies and climate change advances. 260  This will continue to have major 
implications for humans as well as the natural world, in terms of water security, health, 
prosperity and well-being and is likely to provoke more common and more intense water 
conflicts.261 There remain major challenges for Chile in protecting the environmental 
state of its freshwater ecosystems in a way that fairly reflects social and cultural 
relationships with and interests in water.262 There is growing public concern and conflict 
around the role of the market-based model underpinning the Water Code and the ability 
of existing institutions to address the serious environmental problems Chile faces.  
 In this paper we have assessed the legal and policy framework for environmental 
flows in Chile, and found it to be inadequate and in need of change. We have attempted 
to make a case for a more holistic environmental flows regime in Chile, and for the 
government institutions to plan prospectively for and administer a comprehensive 
environmental flow regime, although more research is needed and we invite others to 
build on our argument. We recognise that, in the context of finite water resources, 
safeguarding environmental flows and including a flow of water for Indigenous use may 
be costly and politically unpalatable, potentially requiring the redirection of water away 
from consumptive, economic purposes. However, until these in-stream uses are 
recognized by Chile’s water regime and protected by the legal framework, those who 
seek conservation of in-stream flows will be placed in a position of conflict with those 
who benefit from their absence.  
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 In this time of social uprising around neoliberal politics and the distribution of 
property rights, the Chilean Government should consider the balance between 
constitutionally protected private property and other constitutional environmental, social 
and cultural rights. At the same time, the Government should pay attention to the 
unresolved constitutional demands of Indigenous peoples, because:263 
there are some limited gains to be achieved, in terms of uncovering an historical 
debt with Indigenous People, and at the same time give some hope(s) to the 
possibility of achieving a different, non-western non-liberal, constitutional 
arrangement. The new constitution for Chile needs to make sense of the 
geographical location we live in and the plurality of its inhabitants. This avenue 
could also open up the space for a conversation of alternative legalities after 
500 years of forceful assimilation. 
 The challenge for Chile is to establish and operate a minimum environmental 
flow regime to protect the conservation of a flow of water necessary to maintain healthy 
aquatic ecosystems and reflect Indigenous custodianship for and rights to water 
resources, in a way that applies to existing water users as well as future applicants for 
water rights. This is especially important, because if the Chilean institutions fail to 
effectively plan for minimum environmental flows, they may undermine the potential 
for Chilean rivers to support any water use (including economic) in the future.  
Many would argue that the socio-political dynamics are too entrenched in Chile, 
and institutions too path-dependent, for any sort of transformative change. However, 
Chile is experiencing an unprecedented social change of constitutional scale, which 






and regulation, including adequate provision for the environment and Indigenous 
peoples. 
 
 
